What Israel Can Teach Taiwan

Both Israel and Taiwan face existential threats. Can Taiwan learn anything from Israel’s approach to keeping its at bay? Veteran journalist Peter Enav weighs in
Flickr / CC / Noa City-Eliyahu, Israel Defense Forces
Flickr / CC / Noa City-Eliyahu, Israel Defense Forces
Peter Enav
By

For all their compelling differences, there is one important area where Taiwan and Israel have much in common. Both face existential challenges from abroad. In Israel, the challenges are physical: Muslim forces like Hamas in the Gaza Strip or Hezbollah in southern Lebanon — not to mention nuclear wannabe Iran — are publicly committed to wiping the Jewish state off the map. In Taiwan, by contrast, the challenge is merely systemic. Based on its longstanding claim that the island-nation is part of its territory, China has made no secret of its intention to bring it under its control — by persuasion if possible, by force if necessary. This would necessarily involve replacing Taiwan’s highly cherished democratic institutions with its own authoritarian ones.

Israel knows quite a bit about keeping its existential challenges at bay. Since its establishment 67 years ago, it has fought three wars to safeguard its security (in 1948, 1967 and 1973) and a larger number of sparring matches (not all of them justified) to deter its enemies from attacking it with impunity. Beyond that, it has also created a highly mobilized social system that has largely succeeded in persuading the lion’s share of its people to make considerable sacrifices for the sake of the nation as a whole. Among these are numbingly high tax rates, near universal military service, and a reserve military commitment that obligates healthy men under the age of 50 to devote approximately 30 days annually to their country’s defense.

For the most part Israelis make these sacrifices willingly. They do this because a combination of recent history — particularly the murder of six million Jews by Nazi Germany during World War II — and a welter of credible Islamic threats has taught them that when it comes to their survival, they don’t have any choice. This is not to say that a more flexible brand of Israeli statecraft might well obviate the need for Israel’s leaders to be so militant. But only to a certain extent. Consider: for all the grating brittleness of the contemporary Israeli state (and anyone familiar with Israel’s serially heavy-handed treatment of West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians knows that it is very brittle indeed) it does actually inhabit a very threatening neighborhood. It cannot afford to be lax.

Compared to Israel, Taiwan has obvious disadvantages in mobilizing its citizens against its external threat. One relates to historical consciousness. As horrific as it was, the Nationalist massacre of Taiwanese sparked by the 228 Massacre 68 years ago cannot be compared with the Nazi Holocaust of European Jews during World War II. In consequence, Taiwanese still lack a defining historical moment. At the same time, it has only been since the late 1980s that Taiwanese have been able to speak publicly about the desirability of having formal independence. Previously, they were limited in their pronouncements (or lack thereof) to signing off on the official Nationalist canon that Taiwan is part of China. This obviously stifled the development of freewheeling Taiwanese nationalism — the Taiwanese version of Zionism.

Moreover, compared to the threats posed by Hamas and Hezbollah, the Chinese military challenge to Taiwan seems relatively mild — even allowing for the 1,500 or so conventional missiles the Chinese are directing at Taiwanese targets. It is also true that China’s military budget far outstrips that of Taiwan, but at the same time it has now been more than 50 years since the two sides engaged in direct military confrontation. This has lulled people into thinking that it will never happen again.

To be sure, important changes in Taiwan’s existential consciousness have recently taken place. Arguably the most important of all was the Sunflower Movement, which went a long way toward awakening millions of Taiwanese from a longstanding Nationalist-imposed torpor — a torpor which had convinced many of them that while not necessarily desirable, political union with China was nonetheless inevitable. Combined with the heavy-handed treatment of pro-democracy demonstrators in Hong Kong in 2014, it helped alert many otherwise apolitical Taiwanese to the considerable dangers inherent in a Chinese takeover of their island home. That was a major improvement in their existential consciousness.

But alas, not major enough. Despite their rapidly changing perspectives on the dark essence of cross-strait relations, most Taiwanese are still resistant to making the kind of Israeli-style sacrifices that are necessary to protect themselves from China’s designs on them. A clear example of this is the abject failure of the Ministry of National Defense to attract sufficient numbers of recruits to make its volunteer military scheme a reality. Without doubt, much of this reflects serious problems within the military itself — the kind of problems that surfaced in the summer of 2013 following the death of recruit Hung Chung-chiu (洪仲丘).

But the Hung episode aside, there is still a big challenge facing any Taiwanese leader intent on preserving the island’s de facto independence. This is convincing large numbers of Taiwanese that real sacrifices have to be made to safeguard the island’s liberty. These include developing a strong enough military to convince the other side that any campaign to take over the island by force will exact a prohibitively heavy cost. Such a step will inevitably require higher taxes and much more manpower — not only volunteers, but also older reservists to buttress the armed forces it in the event of a national emergency.

Are Taiwanese now willing to make these sorts of sacrifices? The answer is almost certainly no. To get to that point they will almost certainly need to begin inculcating an Israeli approach to social mobilization. The best way to start doing this is through a Taiwan-centric educational system and a Taiwan-centric consciousness in the mass media. For far too long Taiwanese have been taught that they are either part of China or so bereft of resources that they soon will be, however much they oppose it. Change that message and you begin changing people’s perception of what is possible. Just ask Israelis, who over the past 67 years have leveraged their white-hot historical and nationalist consciousness to overcome the immense existential challenge facing them, and become by far the strongest state in the Middle East.

 

Peter Enav was the head of The Associated Press bureau in Taipei from 2005 to 2014. Prior to that he worked for the AP in Jerusalem.

11 Responses to “What Israel Can Teach Taiwan”

March 24, 2015 at 2:02 pm, Guillaume E. Gillard said:

Interesting comparison, not entirely convincing though.

Taiwanese, due to their peculiar history, would hardly embrace a militarisation of society in the short term, even in the name of their freedoms. The generations now running the economy and the country were the last to feel the heavy hand(or the oversight) of the military dictatorship of the Kuomintang and would not reverse to something remotely similar to it before at least another generation(let us say 15 to 25 years). The sunflower movement has proven leaders are finally reemerging, most will falter, some will endure, but in the end there will be a hardcore ready to fight to the last, and if this hard core manages to teach taiwanese that a voluntary armed force is their strongest wall against China, militarisation won’t be needed.
This point is well understood on the Chinese side and is part of the reason for their rush on all fronts to accelerate integration.

A voluntary army is a short term liability for Taiwan(the RoC) but this reform also implies that if the polity to be defended is the RoC as is, that is Taiwan, Penghu, Matsu, Jinmen, the long term trend will be for a Taiwanese identity to prevail in the armed forces, as it has in public society. On the long run(le tus say 20 years), the RoC forces will, ethnically, be a Taiwanese army.

Now loyalty to land is not loyalty to State, and, as pointed by mister Fagan, the struggle is no more for land but for political power and possible government systems stemming from visions thereof. But what to do when you are made blind to yourself? Taiwan can’t learn from Israel on the media side as it lives with its main communication and broadcast companies sold and bought by a pro-unification part of the KMT and Chinese interests. Israel did not, until recently, have a similar problem of media bias, though Palestinians may understand it really well.

On another front, big money coming in and out of Israel buys loyalties to it, whereas most of Taiwan’s GDP is China bound, and that is something all the militarism in the world won’t solve. There is as much a problem of investment choices as of military identity. Taiwanese businesses mostly love the Chinese market and contrarily to Israeli magnates do not have a 4000 year plus culture of dwelling amongst people they consider utterly different from themselves. They have never been, until 1947, minority, this one was right on point. No cultural background on how to be the small one when you live in a small polity is indeed an important shortcoming. Actually Taiwan would need to put its aboriginal leaders at the forefront to cultivate such a culture.

Reply

Comments are welcome, but will be moderated. Remarks containing abusive language, personal attacks or self-promotion will not be published. We encourage healthy discussion and, above all, tolerance of other's views.